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ROUTINE

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SECRET

CITE [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)

COUNTRY: CHINA (TAIWAN)/UNITED NATIONS

DIST 2 AUGUST 1971

DOI : 29 JULY 1971

SUBJECT: STATEMENT BY GRC FOREIGN MINISTER THAT ROC WOULD PROBABLY REMAIN IN UN IF ROC ABLE TO RETAIN SECURITY COUNCIL SEAT; GRC FEAR OF U.S. DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION OF PRC.

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SUMMARY: ON 29 JULY 1971 GRC FOREIGN MINISTER CHOU SHU-K'AI TOLD THE MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATIVE YUAN'S FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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COMMITTEE (FAC) THAT EVEN IF THE PRC WERE VOTED INTO THE UN THIS YEAR, IF THE ROC WAS ABLE TO RETAIN ITS SECURITY COUNCIL SEAT THE ROC WOULD PROBABLY REMAIN IN THE UN. CHOU SAID THE UN REPRESENTATION PROBLEM WAS SIMPLE AND SECONDARY COMPARED WITH THE POSSIBILITY THE U.S. MIGHT GRANT DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION TO THE PRC, WHICH WAS THE GREATEST FEAR OF THE GRC. CHOU FURTHER TOLD FAC MEMBERS ON 29 JULY THAT THE GRC MUST KEEP A COOL HEAD AND WATCH DEVELOPMENTS. AMBASSADOR SHEN HAD BEEN TOLD TO CONDUCT HIMSELF MORE CALMLY. END OF SUMMARY.

1. AT A CLOSED MEETING OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (FAC) OF THE LEGISLATIVE YUAN HELD 29 JULY 1971, FOREIGN MINISTER C H O U SHU-K'AI SPOKE ON THE UNITED NATIONS (UN) CHINA REPRESENTATION PROBLEM. HE SAID THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT THING FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA (ROC) WAS TO MAINTAIN ITS SEAT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE FURTHER STATED THAT EVEN IF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA WERE VOTED INTO THE UN THIS YEAR, IF THE ROC WAS ABLE TO RETAIN ITS SECURITY COUNCIL SEAT THE ROC WOULD PROBABLY REMAIN IN THE UN. [redacted] COMMENT: CHOU DID NOT SPECIFY WHETHER THIS WAS AN OFFICIAL POSITION OR HIS OWN PERSONAL OPINION.) [redacted] COMMENT: [redacted] AS OF

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8 JULY 1971 FAC MEMBERS THEMSELVES HAD CONCLUDED THAT THE ROC WOULD REMAIN IN THE UN AS LONG AS IT WAS ABLE TO RETAIN ITS UN SECURITY COUNCIL SEAT, BUT WOULD OPPOSE ANY PROPOSAL WHICH GIVES THAT SEAT TO THE PRC.) CHOU WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE PROBLEM OF UN REPRESENTATION, ALTHOUGH A DIFFICULT ONE FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA (GRC), WAS SIMPLE AND SECONDARY COMPARED WITH THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE U.S. MIGHT GRANT DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION TO THE PRC. HE SAID THAT THIS WAS THE GREATEST FEAR OF THE GRC, BUT THE GRC DID NOT KNOW WHAT ACTIONS IT MIGHT TAKE TO COUNTER SUCH A POSSIBILITY.

2. IN A REPORT TO THE FAC AT THE 29 JULY MEETING, CHOU SAID THAT AFTER THE GRC RECEIVED NOTIFICATION OF PRESIDENT RICHARD N I X O N'S INTENTION TO VISIT THE PRC, MANY HIGH OFFICIALS OF THE GRC WERE SHOCKED AND ANGRY AND WERE INCLINED TO BELIEVE THAT THE U.S. COULD NO LONGER BE TRUSTED BY THE GRC. CHOU POINTED OUT THAT THIS WAS IRRATIONAL AND THAT IT WAS IMPERATIVE THAT THE GRC NOT GO OFF THE DEEP END BUT, TO THE CONTRARY, IT MUST KEEP A COOL HEAD AND WATCH THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION. CHOU SAID THAT THE ROC AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S.,

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S H E N CHIEN-HUNG, HAD RECENTLY TAKEN IT UPON HIMSELF TO EXPRESS DISPLEASURE OVER NIXON'S PROPOSED VISIT TO THE PRC IN A MANNER THAT THE GRC CONSIDERED TOO EXTREME FOR THE PRESENT. CONSEQUENTLY, THE GRC MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SENT A CABLE TO AMBASSADOR SHEN TELLING HIM TO CONDUCT HIMSELF MORE CALMLY. CHOU SAID THAT, FOR THE PRESENT, THE GRC WAS CLOSELY WATCHING THE SITUATION AND TRYING TO DETERMINE WHAT CONCESSIONS WILL BE OR HAVE BEEN MADE TO THE PRC BY THE U.S.

3. THERE WAS A DIVISION OF OPINION AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE FAC ABOUT THE LATTER STATEMENTS MADE BY CHOU, WITH SOME MEMBERS AGREEING AND SOME NOT EXPRESSING ANY OPINION. HOWEVER, K U CHENG-TING (6253/2973/7844) EXPRESSED HIS OPINION THAT, AT PRESENT, HE AGREED WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CHOU'S STATEMENTS. HE STRONGLY URGED, HOWEVER, THAT THE GRC NOT RELY ON OR FOLLOW THE LEAD OF THE U.S. OR, FOR THAT MATTER, JAPAN; RATHER, HE FELT IT BEST FOR THE GRC TO DEVELOP ITS OWN INDEPENDENT COURSE OF ACTION.

[redacted] COMMENT: IN THE PAST, KU HAS OFTEN PROPOSED THAT THE GRC SHOULD BE MORE SELF-RELIANT IN THE FIELD OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.) (b)(1) (b)(3)

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